副董事長的想法:過去和未來——芒格對伯克希爾50年評論

副董事長的想法:過去和未來——芒格對伯克希爾50年評論

“John Wooden在學會分配幾乎所有的上場時間給他最好的七名球員之后,基本上就經常地獲得勝利。”

(伯克希爾哈薩維2015年2月28日發表,2014股東的信的第39頁;翻譯發表于北京時間2015年3月18日)

翻譯前言:

簡單說,這篇文章就是以芒格,這個巴菲特身邊幾十年的朋友角度,剖析伯克希爾50年來為什么會成功(這篇文章提到了他稱之為“伯克希爾系統”的架構),巴菲特卸任后會如何,成功可以復制到其他公司否。其中,15條的伯克希爾系統構架說明,作為回顧和總結,應該是非常有價值。其他部分也就回答了伯克希爾系統的未來。

關于芒格,我還記得他的一句話“人生不僅僅是精明的積累財富”。寫出來也給雪友共勉。本文感覺非常理性,從那么多1234的分點就知道是理性的文章。估計早年律師生涯法律讀慣了。。。但這樣寫起來真的非常好,思路很廣闊和發散,評價面也比較廣闊。不過,在談論伯克希爾構架的時候,要點多達十幾點,實在太多了點。另外我認為會這樣寫,也是因為他不是巴菲特,沒有那么多諸如購買伯克希爾那時候的私人恩怨,這一類故事可以講。

Vice Chairman’s Thoughts – Past and Future

副董事長的想法:過去和未來

To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希爾哈薩維股東:

I closely watched the 50-year history of Berkshire’s uncommon success under Warren Buffett. And it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement whatever celebratory comment comes from him. I will try to do five things.

我近距離地觀察了伯克希爾在沃倫 巴菲特領導下過去五十年不同尋常的成功。現在看上去是合適的時候,讓我獨立地補充,不論他本人會做出何種的紀念性評論。我將嘗試著做5件事情。

(1) Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,

(1)描述其管理系統和政策,使得一個小型的,注定要失敗的紡織商品企業,變成現在的龐大的伯克希爾,

(2) Explain how the management system and policies came into being,

(2)解釋管理系統和政策如何形成

(3) Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,

(3)解釋,在某種程度上,為什么伯克希爾做得如此之好。

(4) Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and

(4)如果巴菲特很快就卸任的話,預測是否不同尋常的好結果會繼續,并且

(5) Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

(5)考慮是否伯克希爾過去50年的優異成績有些啟示,可能在別處也被證明有用。

The management system and policies of Berkshire under Buffett (herein together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and are described below:

(1) Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.

巴菲特領導下的伯克希爾的管理系統和政策(在此統稱為“伯克希爾系統”)很早就就固定,并且描述如下:

(1)伯克希爾將是一個分散的企業集團, 其僅會反對那些不能做出令人滿意預測的業務類型。

(2) Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.

(2)它的母公司將會做幾乎所有類型的生意,通過獨立的股份有限子公司,子公司CEO們的經營將會有極大自治權

(3) There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing a

Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.

(3)企業集團的總部幾乎沒有任何東西,除了一個小辦公司套間,包括一個主席,一個CFO,一些主要幫助CFO做審計,內部控制的助手。

(4) Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.

(4) 伯克希爾子公司將顯著地總會包括災害保險公司。 這些成群的保險公司將被期待著及時產生可靠的保險認購收益,并且也會產生大量的“浮存金”(來自還未支付的保險負債)用于投資。

(5) There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.

(5)沒有顯著的,系統性的人員系統,股票期權系統,其他激勵系統,退休系統,或者諸如此類系統,因為子公司將有他們自己的系統,而系統常常是不同的。

(6) Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.

(i) He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.

(6)伯克希爾主席將僅僅為自己保留少數活動。

(i)他將管理幾乎所有的證券投資,它們通常屬于伯克希爾的災害保險公司。

(ii) He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.

(ii)他將選擇所有重要子公司的CEO,他將會確定他們的報酬,并且從他們每個人的私人推薦中獲得繼任者(人選),如果突然需要繼任者的話。

(iii) He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.

(iii)他將在子公司增加了它們的競爭優勢之后,配置其不需要的大部分現金,理想的配置是使用那些現金去收購新的子公司。

(iv) He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.

(iv)若子公司CEO有任何聯絡的需要,他將立即能夠被聯絡,并且他將幾乎不需要另外的聯絡。

(v) He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.

(v)他將在他的年度報告中撰寫長篇的,有邏輯的,有用的信件,此信件將被設計成,如果他本人是一個僅僅被動持有的股東,所希望成為的樣子,并且他將能花幾小時的時間,在年度股東大會上回答問題。

(vi) He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.

(vi)他將嘗試著成為,一個對顧客、股東和其他在職者而言,長期運作良好的文化的榜樣,在他卸任前后都是如此。

(vii) His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularly that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and

(vii)他的首要任務將是保留大量時間安靜地閱讀和思考,特別是那些可能提高他的決策的學習,不論他變得多老,并且

(viii) He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing.

(viii)他也將花費許多時間在熱情地欽佩他人的成就

(7) New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.

(7)新的子公司將通常被現金收購,而不是新發行股票。

(8) Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.

(8)只要能用一美元的留存利潤,為股東創造多于一美元的市場價值,伯克希爾就將不會支付股利。(老鼠注:這點挺著名的,也是為什么其A股這么高價的原因。)

(9) In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.

(9)關于購買新子公司,伯克希爾將尋求以合理的價格購買好的生意,此生意是主席能夠很好地理解的。伯克希爾將同樣希望(該公司)有一個好的CEO在任,他被期待繼續長期留任,并且能在不需要總部幫助的情況下,很好地管理公司

(10) In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.

(10)關于選擇子公司的CEO,伯克希爾將設法確保其可靠,有技能,有活力并熱愛CEO所在企業和環境。

(11) As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.

(11)作為重要的優先選擇的方式, 伯克希爾將幾乎不會出售子公司。

(12) Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.

(12)伯克希爾幾乎不會將子公司的CEO調到其他不相關子公司(任職)

(13) Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.

(13)伯克希爾將不會強迫子公司的CEO僅因為年齡退休

(14) Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.

(14)伯克希爾將少有債務未清償,因為它試圖保持(i)在任何狀況下,實質上完美的信譽 和(ii) 當出現不同尋常的機會的時候,容易獲得可以調配的現金和貸款。

(15) Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.

(15)對潛在的大公司的賣家而言,伯克希爾將總是友好的。一個此類公司的報價,將獲得快速的關注。在伯克希爾,只有主席和一兩個其他人,會知道這個報價,如果此報價沒有導致交易的話。并且他們將不會告訴局外人有關交易的事。

Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size are quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.

伯克希爾系統的要素和它們聚集的規模都是如此不同尋常。據我所知,沒有其他的大型企業具備一半這樣的要素。

How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so different from the norm?

 伯克希爾如何恰好擁有一個如此與眾不同的企業性格呢?

Well, Buffett, even when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire’s shares and was completely trusted by all the other big shareholders. He could install whatever system he wanted. And he did so, creating the Berkshire system.

嗯,巴菲特,即使當年僅有34歲而已,控制了大約45%的伯克希爾股份,并且完全被其他大股東所信任。他能夠建立任何他所想要的系統。 并且他也這么做了,創造了伯克希爾系統。

Almost every element was chosen because Buffett believed that, under him, it would help maximize Berkshire’s achievement. He was not trying to create a one-type-fits-all system for other corporations. Indeed, Berkshire’s subsidiaries were not required to use the Berkshire system in their own operations. And some flourished while using different systems.

幾乎每個要素的選擇,都是因為巴菲特相信,在他的領導下,它將幫助最大化伯克希爾的成就。他不打算為其他的企業,創造一個適用于所有的系統。事實上,伯克希爾的子公司們并不需要在它們自身的運營中使用伯克希爾的系統。并且當使用不同的系統時,一些公司也很興盛。

(注: while這里可以做 時間 解, 可以做“雖然” 解,可以做 轉折“但是,卻” 解, 聯系上句這里取時間解釋)

What was Buffett aiming at as he designed the Berkshire system?

 當巴菲特設計伯克希爾系統的時候,他的目標是什么?

Well, over the years I diagnosed several important themes:

(1) He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself.

(2) He wanted win/win results everywhere--in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance.

(3) He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions.

(4) He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.

(5) He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.

嗯,這些年來,我分析了幾個重要的因素:

(1)他特別希望,持續最大化多數此系統中重要人員的理性,技巧和奉獻精神,從他自己開始。

(2)他希望處處都有 雙贏 的結果——比如說,用忠誠待人的方式,去獲得忠誠

(3)他希望做出最大化長期結果的決定,從通常持續在位足夠長時間,以承擔決定結果的決策者那里尋求(決策答案/參考)

(4)他希望最小化總部內,來自龐大官僚機構的,幾乎不可避免的負面影響

(5)他希望親身地做出貢獻,像本杰明 格雷厄姆教授那樣,傳播他所獲得的智慧。

When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all the benefits that followed? No. Buffett stumbled into some benefits through practice evolution. But, when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes.

當巴菲特開發伯克希爾系統的時候,他預見到了所有后來發生的好處么?不。巴菲特磕磕絆絆地通過實踐的進化,才獲得了一些好處。但是,當他看到有用的結果時,他強化了它們的成因。

Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well?

為什么伯克希爾在巴菲特的領導下做得如此出色?

Only four large factors occur to me:

(1) The constructive peculiarities of Buffett,

(2) The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system,

(3) Good luck, and

(4) The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press.

我只想到四大因素:

(1)巴菲特有益的特性

(2)伯克希爾系統有益的特性

(3)好運,以及

(4)一些股東和其他崇拜者,包括一些媒體界人士,不尋常地強烈的,有傳染性的忠誠

I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.

我相信所有四個因素都存在且有用。但是沉重的貨物,是由有益的特性,不尋常的忠誠,和他們之間的關系,所承載的。

In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good at tennis.

特別地, 巴菲特決定限制他的業務于少數類型,而且最大化他的注意力于此類類型,并持續如此做了50年,非常出色。巴菲特的成功和羅杰 費德勒成為網球高手的原因是一樣的。

Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.

巴菲特,事實上,使用了著名棒球教練John Wooden的致勝方法。 John Wooden在學會分配幾乎所有的上場時間給他最好的七名球員之后,基本上就經常地獲得勝利。

And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.

而且巴菲特的情況大大超越了Wooden,因為技能的練習集中于一個人,而不是七個,隨著他50年間變得越來越老,他的技能提升再提升,而不是像棒球運動員的技能那樣退化。

Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.

此外,以在長期服務的,重要子公司的CEO身上集中如此多才華和權力的方式,巴菲特也創造了強大的Wooden式效果。并且此類效果提高了CEO的能力和子公司的成績。

Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.

然后,因為伯克希爾系統授予了許多子公司和它們的CEO所渴望的自治,以及伯克希爾變得成功且著名,這些結果吸引更多,更好的子公司進入到伯克希爾,也吸引了更好的CEO。

And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”

更好的子公司和CEO需要總部更少的關注,創造常被稱為“良性循環”(的局面)。

How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?

總是將災害保險公司,作為重要的子公司,對伯克希爾的發展而言有多么好?

Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.

不可思議地好。伯克希爾的雄心是無由地強烈,并且,縱使如此,它得到的它所想要的。

Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.

災害保險經常投資于普通股,其價值大概以股東權益計算,正如伯克希爾的保險子公司做的那樣。并且,在過去50年里,標準普爾500指數每年提供大約10%的稅前收益,創造了重要的推力。

And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.

并且,在巴菲特時代早期的幾十年里,伯克希爾保險子公司內的普通股大幅地勝過指數,正如巴菲特所期待的那樣。隨后,當伯克希爾龐大的持股規模和收入稅收考慮,導致戰勝指數部分的收益退化到不重要的時候(或許不是永遠的),其他的和更好的優勢出現了。Ajit Jain 從零開始創造了一個龐大的再保險公司,產生巨量的“浮存金”和大量承保收益。并且GEICO整個并入了伯克希爾,隨后GEICO的市場價值變成原來的四倍。還有,其他的伯克希爾保險運營大幅度地提高,主要是憑借企業的聲譽優勢,承保條款,尋找和留在好的利基市場,并招募和保留杰出的人才。(老鼠備注: Ajit Jain,出生于印度, 本科就讀于印度IIT, MBA就讀于哈佛大學管理學院, 在80年代中期加入伯克希爾,現在是保險事務主席。)

Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.

隨后,晚些時候,因為伯克希爾幾乎獨特且很可靠的企業人格和大的規模,變得非常著名,它的保險子公司獲得并抓住了許多吸引人的,其他公司所不能獲得的機會,去購買非公開發行的有價證券。這些有價證券的大多數,有固定的到期期限,并產生良好的結果。

Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.

伯克希爾在保險領域不可思議的結果不是自然而然的。通常地,一個災害保險公司是平庸結果的制造者,縱使是在相當好地管理下。此種結果沒什么作用。伯克希爾的更好結果,是如此令人震驚地巨大,我相信巴菲特現在難以再次創造它,如果其變回到一個小公司,縱使巴菲特保持他的聰明且回復年輕。

Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.

伯克希爾因為成為分散的企業集團而痛苦么?不,通過范圍更廣泛的經營,它的機會有效地擴大了。并且,在其他地方很普遍的負面影響,通過巴菲特的技能得以避免。

Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.

為什么伯克希爾傾向于用現金購買公司,而不是它自己的股票?嗯,通過交換獲得的任何股份,要與所讓出的伯克希爾股份價值相當,是很困難的。

Why did Berkshire’s acquisition of companies outside the insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for shareholders of the acquirer?

為什么在保險公司之外,伯克希爾為股東而進行的公司收購,進展如此順利,當此類收購的通常結果,對于(其他公司的)收購者的股東而言是壞的時候?

Well, Berkshire, by design, had methodological advantages to supplement its better opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor. And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one.

嗯,伯克希爾,依據設計,有方法論上的優勢,以補充它更好的機會。它從未設立與“收購部門”等價的部門,在壓力下購買公司。并且它從不依賴于“幫助者”的建議,他們一定有支持交易的偏見。而且巴菲特自以為走投無路,正如他聲稱沒有專業知識,但是他知道的比大多數公司管理者還要多,知道哪些在商業中有用,哪些沒用,借助于他作為一個被動投資者的長期經驗。并且,最后地,即使當伯克希爾比其他公司獲得更好的機會,巴菲特經常表現出幾乎非人的耐心,并很少購買。舉例說來,在他控制伯克希爾公司的前十年里,巴菲特看著一個公司(紡織)走向死亡,兩家新公司進入,凈增一家公司。

What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.

在巴菲特的領導下,伯克希爾所犯的大錯有哪些?嗯, 雖然委任的錯誤是普遍的,但幾乎所有大的錯誤都是沒有進行購買,包括沒有購買沃爾瑪的股票,當它一定會發展極為順利的時候。遺漏的錯誤是很重要的。伯克希爾的凈值現在將會至少多出500億美元,如果它抓住一些機會,它的確不夠聰明,(以將這些機會)識別為事實上確定的事情。

The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart.

在我清單上,接著上一個任務的是:如果巴菲特很快就卸任的話,預測是否不同尋常的好結果會繼續。

The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.

回答是:是的。伯克希爾在它的子公司中已經具備許多公司(可延續的)勢頭,根植于許多長期競爭優勢。

Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise “bolt-on” acquisitions.

另外,它的鐵路和公共事業子公司現在提供非常令人滿意的機會,以在新的固定資產上,投資大量金額。并且許多子公司現在正參與明智的“附加的”并購。

(編者注:因篇幅所限,以下英文原文略)


假設大部分的伯克希爾系統保持原樣,現在所展現的勢頭和機會的結合是如此巨大,以至于伯克希爾將幾乎肯定會繼續在非常長時間內,優于一般的企業,縱使(1)巴菲特明天離開 ,(2)他的繼任者是只有平庸能力的人,并且(3)伯克希爾決不再購買一個大公司。

但是,在這個巴菲特很快離開的假設之下, 他的繼任者將不是“僅有平庸能力”的。例如,Ajit Jain和Greg Abel 是已經證明表現的人,他們的表現可能將會被描述為“世界級”。如果讓我選擇,我會用“世界領先”描述。在一些重要的方面,他們中每一個都是比巴菲特更好的企業管理者。(老鼠備注:巴菲特沒有明確說未來繼承人是誰。但因為芒格這50年評論中,就是在此處,提到了這2個人,所以有分析認為,他們會是負責人。據雪友malamala,“印象中巴菲特對接班人的安排是三個方面的,一個董事長,一個負責投資的CEO,一個負責企業管理的CEO。從前文看,此兩位可能是負責企業管理的CEO人選”)

并且我相信Jain和Abel都不會(1)離開伯克希爾,不論其他人開價如何 (2)要求大幅改變伯克希爾系統

我也不認為令人滿意的新企業購買將會隨著巴菲特離開而結束。鑒于伯克希爾現在如此龐大,和我們面臨的激進投資主義時代,我認為一些令人滿意的收購機會將會來到,并且伯克希爾的600億美元現金將有益地減少。

我最后的任務是考慮是否伯克希爾過去50年的優異成績有些啟示,可能在別處也被證明有用。

答案顯而易見的是。在巴菲特的早期幾年,伯克希爾面前有一個大任務:將一個小的儲藏物,變成一個巨大而有用的企業。而且它會采用長期避免官僚主義,和很大程度上依賴于深思熟慮的領導人的方式,去解決問題,因為他會繼續進步,并且請來更多像他自己一樣的人。

與典型的大公司系統相比較,它們的總部很官僚,并有一串CEO在大約59歲入職,此后很少停下來安靜思考,且很快因固定的退休年齡而被迫離職。

我相信,伯克希爾系統版本將會被更加經常地在別處嘗試,并且官僚主義最壞的屬性將會被更經常地像癌癥般對待,它們是如此類似。一個好的修正官僚主義的例子,是喬治 馬歇爾創造的,當時他從議會獲得權力,忽略選擇將軍所需的級別,從而幫助贏得了二戰。

真誠地!

查爾斯 芒格

(www.ulfwbi.tw)

來源 | 雪球

作者 | 芒格  譯 | 可可老鼠

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